HONG KONG/BEIJING: In rapid succession, Washington has moved against two of Beijing’s closest geopolitical partners. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is now detained in the United States following an extraordinary special forces operation in Caracas, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint US-Israeli strike on Tehran.
China condemned both actions as violations of sovereignty and expressions of regime change, reiterating its friendship with affected states. Yet beyond diplomatic rebukes, Beijing has taken limited practical steps to challenge its rival or alter the trajectory of events.
For Chinese leader Xi Jinping, pragmatism appears to guide calculations. Iran, while a longstanding partner, ranks below other priorities — including stable relations with Washington as both sides pursue cautious engagement ahead of prospective high-level talks. Analysts also suggest Beijing may view US military attention diverted to the Middle East as reducing pressure in the Indo-Pacific, where strategic rivalry remains intense.
“China is a fair-weather friend — long on words, short on risk,” said Craig Singleton of the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Beijing will speak at the United Nations but avoid significant support that could escalate tensions.”
Although China is Iran’s largest buyer of crude oil, the strategic relationship is narrower than often assumed. Military cooperation remains limited and China’s commercial interests in the Middle East are diversified across the Gulf. Beijing seeks balanced relations, engaging both Iran and rivals such as Saudi Arabia.
“China sees little benefit in heightening tensions with the US over Iran,” said William Yang of the International Crisis Group. “Maintaining the trade truce and overall stability with Washington remains a higher priority.”
Beijing’s calculations
China has historically provided diplomatic and economic support to Iran, purchasing much of its oil and opposing Western sanctions. Tehran’s inclusion in China-backed institutions such as BRICS has broadened its diplomatic reach during years of Western isolation.
Chinese companies have reportedly supplied materials used in Iran’s missile programme and contributed to surveillance infrastructure, though Beijing maintains its trade complies with international law. At the same time, China has avoided direct involvement in regional conflicts, limiting engagement to rhetorical statements.
That restraint was evident during escalations between Iran and Israel last year and subsequent US airstrikes, where Beijing offered diplomatic expressions of concern but no operational role.
“China has avoided positioning itself as a security guarantor for Global South countries,” said political scientist Ja Ian Chong of the National University of Singapore. Historical experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, he noted, have discouraged Beijing from assuming military responsibilities abroad.
China’s relationship with Iran also serves economic and strategic objectives. Energy imports bolster Chinese industrial demand, while diplomatic engagement enhances influence in the Middle East. Beijing has simultaneously cultivated ties with regional rivals, helping broker a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.
Nonetheless, Washington increasingly observes closer coordination among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Leaders from all four states appeared together in Beijing at a military parade last September, and joint drills have reinforced perceptions of emerging strategic alignment.
“Iran has been a long-term partner of the PRC, but it is not existential to Chinese interests,” said Chong. Yet limited support during recent crises raises questions about Beijing’s reliability as a partner in adversity.
Analysts note that regardless of political change in Tehran, economic interdependence with China is likely to persist. Chinese demand for energy and investment provides incentives for continued cooperation.
Events in the Middle East also present strategic implications for Beijing. Extended US military engagement could divert Washington’s resources and attention, potentially easing pressure in the Indo-Pacific — a region where China and the United States contest influence.
A protracted conflict might also strain US defence resources. Beijing has restricted exports of rare earth elements for military applications, materials critical for advanced technologies from missiles to fighter jets, complicating efforts to replenish Western stockpiles.
Short-term disruptions
Despite strategic considerations, immediate economic impacts are unavoidable. China imports the vast majority of Iran’s crude exports, which account for roughly 13% of its seaborne oil supplies, according to data from Kpler.
Energy trade relies on complex networks involving independent refineries and intermediary shipping arrangements that reduce exposure to US sanctions. These operations, often described as “teapot refineries,” process oil outside state-controlled systems.
The United States has targeted entities involved in sanctioned shipping and refining networks with punitive measures, increasing pressure on Iran’s energy sector. Yet analysts believe China’s diversified supply sources mitigate the risk of severe shortages.
Richard Jones of Energy Aspects noted that Iranian exports have increased since mid-February and alternative suppliers, including Russia, could compensate for disruptions.
More pressing for Beijing is regional instability affecting maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of global oil shipments pass. Conflict or closure of the strait could disrupt energy flows and elevate prices.
Iran controls the northern approaches to the waterway, and recent threats from military advisers have heightened concerns about shipping security. Several tankers reportedly suspended operations following attacks and escalating tensions.
China’s foreign ministry emphasised the importance of maritime stability. “Safeguarding security in this region serves the common interests of the international community,” spokeswoman Mao Ning said, urging diplomatic de-escalation.
Stockpiled reserves may cushion short-term shocks. China reportedly holds more than 1.2 billion barrels of crude inventories, equivalent to several months of imports, reducing immediate vulnerability.
An alternative global model
Beijing is likely to frame US interventions as evidence of Western unilateralism, contrasting its doctrine of non-interference with Washington’s security-oriented approach. This messaging resonates with developing countries wary of external political conditions.
Some Chinese analysts argue that avoiding security commitments preserves strategic flexibility and reduces risk. “It gives China greater room for manoeuvre,” said Zichen Wang of the Center for China and Globalization. However, critics caution that limited engagement constrains Beijing’s ability to influence outcomes when crises escalate.
The debate highlights broader questions about global governance. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nations face choices between alliance-based security models and economic partnerships prioritising sovereignty.
For China, cautious pragmatism remains the guiding principle. For Washington, assertive interventions reflect different assumptions about international order. Between these approaches lies a complex landscape where developing nations must navigate competing interests.
The outcomes of recent events in Venezuela and Iran may reshape perceptions of reliability among global partners. Whether China’s restraint strengthens or undermines its influence remains an open question — one with implications far beyond Asia and the Middle East.
